












































































































































                                                1	I	take	no	stand	here	on	whether	such	episodic	memory’s	content	is	given	by	the	rain,	by	the	past	seeing	of	the	rain,	or	by	both	(see	Fernández	2006).	Nonetheless,	for	simplicity	I	will	discuss	the	matter	as	though	the	object	of	the	episodic	memory	is	some	external	rain.			2	The	version	of	the	account	that	I	favor,	and	which	seems	to	me	to	do	greater	justice	to	the	undirected	character	of	moods,	holds	that	moods	are	not	self-standing	mental	states,	but	rather	modifications	of	other	mental	states:	one	can	anxiously	perceive,	or	anxiously	remember,	or	anxiously	love,	but	one	cannot	simply	anxiousize.	A	mood	contributes	to	one’s	overall	experience	a	distinctive	attitudinal	feature,	but	makes	no	contributions	of	its	own	at	the	level	of	content.	Thus,	to	anxiously	remember	x	is	to	be	in	a	conscious	state	that	both	represents-as-past	and	represents-as-threatening	x;	to	euphorically	love	y	is	to	be	in	a	conscious	state	that	both	represents-as-lovely	and	represents-as-exciting	y;	and	so	on.		3	Mindful	that	I	have	not	offered	here	any	arguments	for	the	attitudinal	treatment	of	the	phenomenal	properties	I	claimed	above	were	attitudinal,	I	hasten	to	add	that	the	arguments	I	provide	elsewhere	(in	the	above-cited	works)	are	not	simple	introspective	assertions.	Part	of	the	reason	is	precisely	that	I	doubt	introspection	can	tell	apart	representing	x	as	F	and	representing-as-F	x.		4	This	philosophical	interpretation	is	founded	on	suspect	theoretical	principles,	namely,	that	the	representational	character	of	a	mental	state	is	exhausted	by	its	representational	content,	perhaps	even	the	character	of	the	represented	environmental	features.	These	principles	embody	a	blindspot	in	contemporary	philosophy	of	mind:	the	routine	disregard	or	unawareness	of	attitudinal	properties	of	the	form	representing-
as-F.		5	My	convictions	in	this	area	are	very	weak,	but	my	inclination	is	to	think	that	for-me-ness	does	amount	to	mineness	in	a	normal	human	adult,	but	may	not	in	nonhuman	animals,	children,	and	certain	pathologies	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.5).			6	The	analogy	may	be	imperfect,	inasmuch	as	it	is	mostly	the	keystone’s	relational	properties	that	confer	on	it	its	special	status,	so	that	it	is	substitutable	for	almost	any	stone	used	in	making	up	the	arch;	whereas	for-me-ness	could	not	swap	roles	with	the	property	of	representing	a	red	surface	for	the	status	of	enabling	all	other	phenomenality.	Still,	in	both	cases	there	is	a	single	constituent	of	a	structure	that	is	also	essential	for	the	status	of	a	number	of	other	items	as	further	constituents	of	that	structure.			7	There	are	probably	other	antecedently	reasonable	candidates	for	the	substantive	commonality	among	conscious	states,	but	for-me-ness	offers	one	clear	such	candidate,	and	the	one	I	am	adopting	here,	admittedly	with	little	argument.	For	more	argument,	see	Kriegel	2009,	forthcoming-b.		8	On	the	view	I	have	defended,	for	example,	it	is	rather	constituted	by	a	self-representational	property	of	conscious	states	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.4).	It	is	also	possible	to	hold	that	it	is	a	non-representational	property	altogether,	a	kind	of	‘intrinsic	glow’	inhering	in	conscious	states.	Either	view	is	incompatible	with	the	notion	that	all	phenomenal	properties	are	first-order	representational	properties.			9	It	might	be	asked	how	we	know	of	phenomenal	properties	that	disappear	under	introspection.	The	answer	is	that	according	to	Brentano,	there	is	a	kind	of	non-introspective	inner	awareness	that	accompanies	all	our	conscious	states.	This	is	also	my	view;	I	go	into	it	momentarily.		10	One	can,	of	course,	turns	one’s	attention	to	the	periphery	of	one’s	visual	field,	or	to	one’s	tactile	sensation	of	the	soles	of	one’s	shoes.	But	in	the	normal	go	of	things,	although	these	are	aspects	of	our	overall	conscious	experience,	they	remain	outside	the	focus	of	conscious	attention	–	they	‘inhabit’	the	background	or	fringe	of	consciousness.			11	I	am	using	‘species’	and	‘genus’	as	metaphysical	terms	here,	not	zoological	ones.	(In	zoology,	these	terms	are	not	used	as	relative	terms,	so	that	x	could	be	a	species	relative	to	y	but	a	genus	relative	to	z;	rather,	they	are	used	to	designate	specific	‘layers’	in	the	tree-like	taxonomy	of	the	animal	kingdom.)	
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                                                                                                                                                       	12	If	we	are	diligent	enough,	in	half	an	hour	we	can	comprehensively	enumerate	the	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	characteristic	of	normal	adult	human	conscious	experience;	at	least,	we	can	enumerate	all	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	such	experience	uncontroversially	exhibits,	and	then	all	those	it	might	exhibit	(pending	certain	controversies,	such	as	that	surrounding	cognitive	phenomenology).	In	contrast,	enumerating	the	content-based	phenomenal	properties	normal	adult	human	conscious	experience	exhibits	would	be	an	extremely	tedious	long-term	(indeed	perhaps	interminable)	task.		13	Work	on	this	paper	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency’s	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and	ANR-10-LABX-0087,	as	well	as	by	grant	675415	of	the	European	Union’s	Horizon	2020	Research	and	Innovation	program.	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	I	am	grateful	to	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	OUP.	I	have	also	greatly	benefited	from	a	discussion	of	the	paper	at	NYU	and	would	like	to	thank	the	audience	there,	in	particular	David	Chalmers,	Kevin	Lande,	Andrew	Lee,	Hedda	Mørch,	Gabe	Rabin,	David	Rosenthal,	and	Jonathan	Simon.	
